BYU Law Review
Volume 1994 | Issue 2

Article 5

5-1-1994

Justice Byron R. White: A Modern Federalist and a
New Deal Liberal
William E. Nelson

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Judges Commons, and the Legal Biography Commons
Recommended Citation
William E. Nelson, Justice Byron R. White: A Modern Federalist and a New Deal Liberal, 1994 BYU L. Rev. 313 (1994).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1994/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

Justice Byron R. White: A Modern Federalist
and a New Deal Liberal
William E. Nelson*
"Conventional wisdom," as chronicled by a sympathetic
former law clerk, "suggests that Justice White has been a
disappointment because he did not turn out to be the 'liberal'
that many expected of President John F. Kennedy's first
appointee."' Contrary to this perceived wisdom, I believe that
Byron R. White was appointed to the Supreme Court because
he was a Kennedy liberal and that, although the Justice's
approach may have changed marginally during his three
decades on the bench,2 on the whole he adhered faithfully to
the political values that had led to his appointment. The
considerable divergence that existed between Justice White's
voting record and the voting patterns of other liberal Justices,
such as his close personal friend, William J. Brennan, who sat
on the Court with Justice White for all but Justice White's
final three Terms, emerged almost entirely during the first
decade of Justice White's judicial tenure-his
decade on the
Warren Court. That divergence, I suggest, resulted less from
changes i n the views of Byron White t h a n from a
transformation in important social and political values in the
mid- to late 1960s.
My proposed interpretation of Justice White's place on the
Supreme Court will proceed first by delineating the contours of
what is labelled "Kennedy liberalism2'-the ideology that
* Professor of Law, New York University Law School. The author clerked
for Justice White during the October 1970 Term. The author wishes to thank the
members of the Legal History Colloquium at New York University for their
comments and criticisms, especially Chris Eisgruber and Martin Flaherty. The
author is especially indebted to Norman Williams (J.D., 1995 candidate, New York
University Law School) for his invaluable help in researching and drafting this
article.
1. Pierce O'Donnell, Common Sense and the Constitution: Justice White and
the Egalitarian Ideal, 58 U . COLO. L. REV.433, 436 (1987).
2. For two examples of White's shift to a more conservative posture during
the late 1980s, see infia notes 66, 79 and accompanying text.

314

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I994

produced Byron White's appointment to the Supreme Court.
Using a three-part a n a l y ~ i s ,I~ will then show how Justice
White approached the three values for which history will
remember the Supreme Court during his period of tenure:
pragmatism, egalitarianism, and individualism. Far from
betraying t h e liberalism embodied by t h e Kennedy
administration and epitomized by the early Warren Court,
Justice White consistently advocated and adhered to Kennedy
liberalism with its emphasis on pragmatic social reform and its
unshakable devotion to equality. The only subject on which the
Justice departed from other liberals was individual rights, but
this departure did not represent a significant ideological shift
for John F. Kennedy's first appointee to the high Court.
Finally, I hope to demonstrate that the Justice's jurisprudential
philosophy, far from eschewing liberalism, fit well within a
coherent and recognized strand of liberalism. Byron R. White's
and John F. Kennedy's liberalism was, I believe, a direct
descendant of the pragmatic, egalitarian liberalism that lay a t
the core of Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal. It was a more
distant descendant of the democratic republicanism of James
Madison and ultimately of the community-driven, republican
political theories of Hume and Montesquieu. It was a liberalism
that other Justices, however, did not fully accept-a liberalism
a t odds with the romantic individualism of Rousseau and Kant
on which other liberals like Justice Brennan ultimately built
their jurisprudential edifice.

Byron White, who served as Deputy Attorney General from
1961 to 1962, was very much a part of the Kennedy team in
the Department of Justice; in fact, he as much as anyone put
the team together? Thus, even in the absence of direct
evidence, there is every reason to believe that Justice White
shared the Kennedy administration's liberal values.
What were those values? First was an unapologetic and
undying belief in rationalism. The Kennedy team possessed
enormous faith in the ability of people to resolve problems
3. See Robert C. Post, William J. Brennan and the Warren Court, in THE
WARREN
COURTIN HISTORICAL
AND POLITICAL
PERSPECTIVE
123 (Mark Tushnet ed.,
1993).
4 . See VICTORS . NAVASKY,KENNEDYJUSTICE163 (1971); ARTHUR M.
SCHLESINGER,
JR., ROBERT
KENNEDY
AND HIS TIMES237 (1978).
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through reason. Members of the administration had "an
abiding faith in man as a rational being committing rational
acts,"5 and those working in the Justice Department "cared
deeply and professionally about the laww6as the rational
means to achieve social change. As is shown by Robert
Kennedy's two weeks of telephone conversations with Governor
Ross Barnett of Mississippi concerning the registration of
James Meredith at the University of Mississippi,? Kennedy
assumed that confrontation should be avoided, that mediation
was preferable t o coercion, and that reasonable people could
always work things out.8 They understood that law,
administered in a practical and sympathetic fashion by
evenhanded officials, was essential to compromise.
As an attorney in private practice in Colorado during the
19509, Byron White had seemed to his partners to be "a
pragmatic problem solver? and he adhered to his pragmatism
upon joining the Kennedy administration. His pragmatism in
the Justice Department is evidenced by a key episode in the
Kennedy years-the
appointment of Burke Marshall as
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights. White, who played
an active role in the appointment, "thought that the
Administration ought t o locate the primary leadership in the
civil rights fight outside the Department of Justice. . . . so that
initiative, aggressive action, education, persuasion should
emanate from a different source than the Department.""
White viewed the Department solely as "a law enforcement
agency and speaking for law and order is to speak for a very
strong position but when you mix law enforcement with other
things . . . . the two together . . . [become] less effective.""
Robert Kennedy agreed. For that reason, Kennedy "didn't want
to have someone in the Civil Rights Division who was dealing
not from fact but was dealing from emotion . . . [or] in the
interest of a Negro or a group of Negroes or a group of those
who were interested in civil rights."12 White expressed the
5. DAVIDHALBERSTAM,
THE BESTAND THE BRIGHTEST
233 (1972) (referring
to Robert S. McNamara).
6. SCHLESINGER,
supra note 4, at 237.
7. The conversations are reported in NAVASKY,
supra note 4, at 165-234.
8. See id. at 164-65.
9. Donald W. Hoagland, Byron White as a Practicing Lawyer in Colorado, 58
U. COLO.L. REV.365, 367 (1987).
10. NAVASKY,
supra note 4, at 161.
11. Id.
12. ROBERTKENNEDY:IN HIS OWN WORDS78-79 (Edwin 0. Guthman &
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same idea when he commented that "it would be more
interesting to get a first-class lawyer who would do the job in a
technically proficient way that would be defensible in
court-that Southerners would not think of as a vendetta, but
as a n even-handed application of the law."13 As an aide to
Kennedy added, "As Bob and White looked ahead to the role
the Justice Department would play in the gathering struggle
over civil rights . . . they felt the only proper course for the
Department would be to proceed in strict accordance with the
law, avoiding any appearance of pitting one social point of view
against another."14 Such a n approach might not lead to a
triumphant victory for any overarching vision of equality, but it
would produce practical advances toward equal civil rights.
All of this is not to claim that Robert Kennedy and Byron
White did not favor the cause of civil rights; they clearly did
favor it. As Robert Kennedy understood it, one of his main
duties in life was to "be kind to others that are less fortunate
than we,"15 and therefore he and White searched for someone
"sensitive . . . to the cause of equal rights," even though "not
identified with it."16 But, while Kennedy and White believed
in the moral good of equality, they understood the success of
the civil rights movement to depend upon the political process,
not the law.
Robert Kennedy decided early on that the best way he and
the Justice Department could help the civil rights cause was to
enforce the federally guaranteed right of blacks to vote.'? As
he explained, he "felt strongly that this was where the most
good could be accomplished. . . . From the vote, from
participation in the elections, flow all other rights far, far more
easily. A great deal could be accomplished internally within a
state if the Negroes participated in elections and v~ted."'~
For
this reason, the Attorney General encouraged civil rights
leaders to focus their equality drive on voting rights and

Jeffrey Shulman eds., 1988) [hereinafter KENNEDY].
13. NAVASKY,supra note 4, a t 162. On White's role in the Marshall
appointment, see SCHLESINGER,
supra note 4, a t 288-89.
14. NAVASKY,
supra note 4, a t 52.
supra note 4, a t 612. The other duty was to "love our
15. SCHLESINGER,
country." Id.
16. NAVASKY,
supra note 4, a t 162.
supra note 4, at 290-91.
17. See SCHLESINGER,
18. KENNEDY, supra note 12, a t 102-03.
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assisted them with a six-fold increase in the number of voterregistration suits filed by the Justice Department.''
Promoting the right of blacks to vote was consistent with a
broader faith in the right to vote and the democratic process i n
general. The Kennedy team was quite sympathetic, for
example, with the one-person-one-vote line of cases growing out
of the 1961 precedent of Baker v. C ~ r r . ~The
' most hesitant
member of the team was Solicitor General Archibald Cox, but
the rest of the Department of Justice team pushed him hard in
the direction of urging judicial enforcement of equal voting
r i g h k 2 l Byron White supported this effort during his stay in
the Department, arguing with Cox that the Government had to
take an amicus posture in favor of the result to which the
Court ultimately came in Baker.22 White also took a stand in
favor of the free functioning of the democratic process when he
wrote President Kennedy a memo urging that strict limits be
placed on invocations of the doctrine of executive privilege. He
maintained that "Congress's need for the information" should
be taken into account in order to make "meaningful
investigation" possible and thereby counteract the tendency of
the executive branch "to hide its errors."23
In short, the Department of Justice team that Byron White
assembled on behalf of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy
fully shared two characteristics associated with the Warren
Court's liberalism: pragmatism and egalitarianism. White
himself, of course, was a strong proponent at Justice of both of
these values. Moreover, both White and the Kennedy Justice
Department were strong proponents of a third value:
democratization of the electoral process and democratic
decisionmaking by the legislative branch. In pursuing these
values, the Kennedy team cast itself firmly in the mold of
Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal, reviving for the last time
the mixture of pragmatism, equality, and democracy that was
its hallmark. At least during his brief stint at the Justice
Department, Byron R. White had planted himself squarely
within the tradition of New Deal liberalism.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See NAVASKY,
supra note 4, at 118, 204.
369 US. 186 (1962).
See NAVASKY,
supra note 4, at 297-322.
See id. at 301-02.
supra note 4, at 381.
SCHLESINGER,
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When Charles E. Whittaker resigned from the Supreme
Court in the spring of 1962, President Kennedy appointed
Byron R. White to replace him because everyone participating
in the nomination process perceived White as a loyal member
of the Kennedy team. There were two other serious candidates
for the position-William H. Hastie and Paul Freund-but
Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice William 0. Douglas
found both of them too conservative and hence obje~tionable.~~
As Warren said of Hastie, "He's not a liberal, and he'll be
opposed to all the measures that we are interested in."25 The
opposition of Warren and Douglas killed consideration of
Hastie and Freund, and when Senator Richard Russell
threatened to bring a delegation to the White House to seek
the appointment of a conservative, President Kennedy moved
quickly to appoint to the Court his liberal Deputy Attorney
General, Byron R. White.26
WHITEAND PRAGMATISM
11. JUSTICE
Upon ascending to the Supreme Court bench, Justice
White continued to make decisions concerning the substance of
the law not on grounds of abstract philosophical theory or
technical legal doctrine, but on the basis of "a pragmatic
As he
estimate as t o how effective [his approach] would be.7727
u.
A
r
i
~ona,~~
wrote in his 1966 dissent in Miranda
constitutional decisions "cannot rest alone on syllogism,
metaphysics or some ill-defined notions of natural justice"; the
Supreme Court and each of its Justices had a continuing duty
"to inquire into the advisability of its end product in terms of
the long-range interest of the country."2gOr, as he maintained
a decade later with a quotation fkom the writings of Justice
Cardozo, "[Tlhe juristic philosophy of the common law is at
bottom the philosophy of pragmatism. . . . The rule that
functions well produces a title deed to re~ognition."~~

24. See KENNEDY,
supm note 12, at 115-16; SCHLESINGER,
supra note 4, at
376-77.
25. KENNEDY,
supra note 12, at 115.
26. See SCHLESINGER,
supra note 4, at 377-78.
27. William E. Nelson, Deference and the Limits to Deference in the
Constitutional Jurisprudence of Justice Byron R. White, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 347,
348 (1987).
28. 384 U.S. 436, 526 (1966) (White, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 531-32.
30. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 403 (1974) (Cardozo, J.,
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Justice White's "focus on the actual operation of the
law"31 rather than on theory and technicality is so clear and
so widely accepted that no need exists to dwell on it at length.
Just a few examples will suffice. One example from the Warren
Court era was his opinion concurring in the judgment in
where the Justice refused to join in
Griswold v. Connecti~ut,~'
the opinions proclaiming a constitutional right to privacy and
debating its source; instead, he decided the case on the wholly
practical ground that he could not "see how the ban on the use
of contraceptives by married couples in any way reinforce[d]
the State's ban on illicit sexual relationship^."^^ Similarly,
Justice White wrote his 1965 opinion in Swain u. Alabama34
not because he felt compelled by precedent but because he
wanted to give a practical warning to "prosecutors that using
peremptories to exclude blacks [from juries] on the assumption
that no black juror could fairly judge a black defendant would
~ ~ when he learned
violate the Equal Protection C l a ~ s e " ;and
that Swain was not giving that warning, he did not feel that
precedent or legal theory precluded him from joining in
White relied
overruling it.36 Finally, in Furman v. Georgia:'
upon "common sense and experience" to hold the death penalty
unconstitutional, since "its imposition" had become a "pointless
and needless extinction of life with only marginal contributions
to any discernible social or public purpose."38
In short, Justice White was part of a generation trained in
legal realism and sociological jurisprudence, and, as such, he
was far more interested in the practical ramifications than the
theoretical soundness of Supreme Court opinions. White
thereby fit into a long line of twentieth-century liberals,
beginning with Louis D. Brandeis, who were willing to ignore
precedent and alter doctrine in the interest of progressive
social change.

dissenting) (quoting SELECTED
WRITINGS
OF BENJAMIN
NATHANCARDOZO
149
(Margaret E. Hall ed., 1947)).
31. Post, supra note 3, at 135.
32. 381 U S . 479, 502 (1965) (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
33. Id. at 505.
34. 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
35. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 101 (1986) (White, J., concurring),
modified by Powers v. Ohio, 499 U S . 400 (1991).
36. Id. at 100-01.
37. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
38. Id. at 312 (White, J., concurring).
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111. JUSTICE
WHITEAND EGALITARIANISM

Much has been written of Justice White's views on
affirmative action and civil rights.3gJustice White's alignment
with the more conservative members of the Court often has
been cited to demonstrate his jurisprudential move toward a
more restricted involvement by the federal courts in the
enforcement of civil rights. Contrary t o this widely held belief,
the Justice's opinions in racial equality cases during his thirtyone years on the Supreme Court were entirely consistent with
the concept of liberalism forged during the New Deal and
predominant at the Kennedy Justice Department.
To begin, during the Warren Court era Justice White
typically voted with Justice Breman and other liberals on
racial equality issues. In leading cases like Goss u. Board of
Education," Grifin v. County School Board:' and Green v.
County School
Justice White joined a unanimous
Court in its efforts t o make the promise of school desegregation
a reality, and in two important cases in which state and local
governments adopted legislation making housing integration
more difficult, he authored important 8-1 and 5-4 opinions
striking the legislation down.43 When the Court began to
divide during the early years of the Burger Court, White
remained with the pro-integration forces in all the main
constitutional cases-Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBoard of
Edu~ation:~Palmer v. Thompson:'
Milliken v. Br~dley;~
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
C ~ r p . , ~and
'
University of California Regents v.
B~kke~~-althoughnow, sometimes, in dissent. His position,
first articulated in Palmer and then adopted by the Court in
Washington u. Davis4' and the Columbuss0 and Daytons1
39. See, e.g., Lance Liebman, Justice White and Affirmative Action, 58 U.
COLO.L. REV. 471 (1987); O'Donnell, supra note 1.
40. 373 U.S. 683 (1963).
41. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
42. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
43. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387
U S . 369 (1967).
44. 402 U.S. 1 (1971); accord Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
45. 403 U.S. 217, 240 (1971) (White, J., dissenting).
46. 418 U.S. 717, 762 (1974) (White,J., dissenting).
47. 429 U.S. 252, 272 (1977) (White, J., dissenting).
48. 438 U.S. 265, 324 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
49. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
50. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
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school desegregation cases, was that "official denigrations" of
blacks and "expression[s] of official policy that Negroes are
unfit to associate with whites" are "at war with the Equal
Protection Clause"52 and justify full-scale remedial
intervention by the
White also remained strongly committed on the Court t o
the position he had held earlier at the Justice Department in
respect to voting rights.54 In Gray v. sander^,^^ Wesberry v.
sander^,^^ and ultimately Reynolds v. Sins,5' he joined a
series of majority opinions that produced the one-person-onevote rule in legislative apportionment cases. Later in the
Warren years he joined a majority opinion written by Justice
Brennan requiring states to "make a good-faith effort t o
achieve precise mathematical equality" in congressional
districtin$' and authored another majority opinion extending
the equal representation requirement to units of local
go~ernment.~~
The Justice failed to commit himself to a broad reading of
the egalitarian principle in only two major cases during the
Warren years: Swain v. Alabama,6o where he wrote the
51. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979).
52. Palmer, 403 US. at 240-41 (White, J., dissenting).
53. See generally Nelson, supra note 27, at 355-58.
54. Recall that White, while he was Deputy Attorney General, was part of a
group that persuaded Solicitor General Archibald Cox to intervene strongly on
behalf of equality in B a h r v. Carr. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
55. 372 US. 368 (1963).
56. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
57. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
58. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530-31 (1969).
59. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
60. 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
His position in Swain, however, appears to be an extension of his view as Deputy
Attorney General that "the occurrence of crimen would not alone "be a sufficient
reason to displace local law enforcement officials" with federal authorities; in
addition, there would need to be "some solid evidence that local law enforcement
people were not going to live up to their responsibilities." Deposition of Justice
Byron R. White, Peck v. United States, 76 Civ. 93 (CES), S.D.N.Y., Dec. 6, 1982,
pp. 8-9. Similarly, the statistical showing in Swain that blacks were
underrepresented on juries did not alone convince White that they were subjects of
purposeful discrimination, and thus he was not prepared to limit prosecutorial use
of peremptory challenges against black prospective jurors. Nonetheless, he adhered
to the basic anti-discrimination principle in Swain and hoped that the case would
warn "prosecutors that using peremptories to exclude blacks on the assumption
that no black juror could fairly judge a black defendant would violate the Equal
Protection Clause." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 101 (1986) (White, J.,
concurring). And, when prosecutors failed to heed Swain's warning, White "agree[d]
with the Court that the time h d d ] come" for the case to be overruled. Id. at 102.
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majority opinion which he later voted to overrule in Batson v.
Kent~cky,~'
and Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,"' where he
joined Justice Harlan's dissent. I cannot account for White's
position in Jones except, perhaps, on one of the theories stated
in Harlan's dissent-that in view of the recent congressional
adoption of fair housing legislation, it was unnecessary to
reinterpret the Thirteenth Amendment in ways that would cast
much existing Supreme Court doctrine into
Having
joined an opinion giving a narrow construction to the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, he continued to support a narrow
construction of that Act in cases such as Runyon u. McCrary6*
and Patterson v. McLean Credit Union.65 In his dissent in
Runyon, where the Court held that a refusal by a private
school to admit black students solely on account of their race
violated a statutory prohibition against racial discrimination in
the making and enforcement of contracts, Justice White argued
that both the legislative history of the statute and "common
sense" precluded such an expansive construction of the 1866
act? In his view, there was a stark difference between racial
discrimination practiced by the government and that practiced
by private individuals. While the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause addressed the former in very broad
fashion, Congress, with several very notable but specific
exception^,^^ had left the latter unregulated. Consistent with
his pragmatic and deferential approach to judicial
interpretation, White felt that the "sensitive policy
considerations" involved in determining which areas of private
associations t o regulate left it "a task appropriate for the
Legislature, not for the Judiciary."' In the absence of a more
explicit statute passed by Congress, White was unwilling to
involve the Court in such a wholesale transformation of
American society.

61. 476 U.S. 79, 101 (1986) (White, J., concurring).
62. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
63. Id. at 477-79 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
64. 427 U.S. 160, 192 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
65. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
66. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 211 (White, J., dissenting).
67. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, $ 701, 78 Stat. 253-66
(current version, as amended, at 42 U.S.C. $9 2000e-2000e17 (1988)); Fair Housing
Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81-90 (currently codified, as amended, at
42 U.S.C. $9 3601-3631 (1988)).
68. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 212 (White, J., dissenting).
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Although White wrote in dissent in Runyon, his views on
this issue gained the support of a majority of the Court during
the early years of the Rehnquist Court. In Patterson, Justice
Kennedy, while refusing to overrule Runyon, held, in an
opinion joined by Justice White, that the same statutory
provision construed in Runyon did not prohibit racial
harassment on the job. Perhaps taking heed of Justice White's
dissent in Runyon, Congress, in the wake of Patterson and
other civil rights opinions that restricted the scope of civil
rights protection, enacted legislation in 1991 that overturned
Patterson and gave clear guidance to the federal judiciary that
racial discrimination in the making and enforcing of private
contracts was prohibited?'
Although Justice White's opinions in civil rights cases
during the Burger and Rehnquist Courts are often cited as
evidence of a gradual conservative shift in the Justice's views, I
suggest that Justice White's approach to civil rights
adjudication, particularly his opinions in affirmative action and
voting rights cases, was consistent with the egalitarian values
of the Kennedy Justice Department. Far from retreating from
the judicial protection of civil rights, Justice White remained
committed to eradicating governmental barriers to equal rights,
but as the civil rights agenda embraced a more expansive role
for government in remedying the legacy of racial
discrimination, Justice White's pragmatism and unerring faith
in the political process's ability to address social problems led
the Justice to join Court opinions that prodded Congress t o
address via legislation what, in his view, the judiciary could
not resolve via court order. A quick survey of Justice White's
opinions in affirmative action and voting rights cases after the
Warren Court era reveals this consistent and, I argue,
egalitarian approach to civil rights enforcement.
To his last days on the Court, Justice White remained an
ardent supporter of giving broad construction to twentiethcentury federal legislation that prohibited racial discrimination
in employment and housing. His approach to this legislation
was markedly different from his reading of the 1866 law.
Although the Justice, as his opinions in Runyon and Patterson
indicated, felt that it was the duty of Congress t o address via
the political process the complex problems presented in
69. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, g 101, 105 Stat. 1071-81
(currently codified at 42 U.S.C. 8 1981 (Supp. I11 1991)).
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defining the appropriate scope and remedy for discrimination
i n the private sector, White was unwilling to side with
conservatives on the Rehnquist Court who invariably pursued
narrow interpretations of statutes after Congress had enacted
others. Thus, in one of the last civil rights cases i n which the
Justice participated, White joined the dissent in St. Mary's
Honor Center u. Hicksp7Owhich raised the threshold for the
burden of proof that a victim of employment discrimination had
to satisfy in order to prevail i n a Title VII claim. The dissent
recognized that it was "unfair and utterly impractical" to
require victims of discrimination to meet this higher burden,
particularly since the sole beneficiaries of the ruling were
employers "who have been found to have given false evidence
in a court of law."71 Moreover, the dissent did not ignore the
practical ramifications of the majority's refusal to read Title
VII capaciously. The Court's approach "promote[d] longer trials
and more pre-trial discovery, threatening increased expense
and delay in Title VII litigation for both plaintiffs and
defendants, and increased burdens on the judiciary."72
Justice White also sided with the liberals in every major
affirmative action case questioning the power of Congress and
the states to adopt race-conscious remedies to redress past
discrimination. When the Court confronted the constitutionality
of affirmative action in Regents of the University of California
u. B ~ k k e , ?Justice
~
White authored, together with Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, a joint opinion which
denied that the Constitution mandates color-blindness and held
that "Government may take race into account when it acts not
to demean or insult any racial group, but to remedy
disadvantages cast on minorities by past racial p r e j u d i ~ e . " ~ ~
70. 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2756 (1993) (Souter, J., joined by White, Blackmun, and
Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
71. Id. at 2758, 2763 (Souter, J., joined by White, Blackmun, and Stevens,
JJ., dissenting).
72. Id. at 2763 (Souter, J., joined by White, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.,
dissenting).
73. 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (holding the special admissions program administered
by a state university medical school whereby a specific number of spots in the
entering class were reserved for racial minorities violated the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause). Justice Powell announced the judgment of
the Court and delivered an opinion which, to the extent that it reversed the
California Supreme Court's determination that the University could never take race
into account in its admissions criteria, commanded a majority of the Court. Id. at
320 (opinion of Powell, J.); id. a t 326 (opinion of Breman, White, Marshall, and
Blackmun, JJ.).
74. Id. at 325 (Breman, J., joined by White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.,
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Recounting the nation's long history of providing separate but
unequal educational opportunities to racial minorities, the
Justices explained that the affirmative action program adopted
by the medical school of the University of California at Davis
"does not simply advance less qualified applicants; rather, it
compensates applicants, who it is uncontested are fully
qualified to study medicine, for educational disadvantages
which it was reasonable t o conclude were a product of statefostered di~crimination."~~
,~~
White
Two years later in Fulliloue v. K l u t ~ n i c k Justice
joined Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion upholding the
authority of Congress to adopt legislation requiring a 10% setaside of federal funds for minority businesses on local public
works projects. Unlike the affirmative action program
challenged in Bakke, which was adopted and administered by
an instrumentality of the state, the congressionally mandated
set-aside for minority-owned businesses upheld in Fullilove was
a creature of the federal government. Lest anyone doubt the
broad authority granted Congress to remedy the legacy of
racial discrimination through the use of race-conscious
provisions, the plurality announced that "[ilt is fundamental
that in no organ of government, state or federal, does there
repose a more comprehensive remedial power than in the
Congress, expressly charged by the Constitution with
competence and authority t o enforce equal protection
guarantee^."^^ Justice White remained committed to this
broad construction of federal authority to adopt race-conscious
remedies up to his last years on the Court, when, in Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC," three years prior to his
retirement, he joined Justice Brennan's broad affirmation of
the power of a federal agency, pursuant to congressional
authorization, to adopt policies designed to increase minority
participation-in this case in radio and television broadcasting
ownership.
Although Justice White gave great deference t o action by
the states and the national government t o redress past
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
75. Id. at 375-76 (Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
76. 448 US. 448, 453 (1980) (opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by White and
Powell, JJ.).
77. Id. at 483 (opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by White and Powell, JJ.).
78. 497 US. 547 (1990).
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discrimination through affirmative action, the Justice was less
tolerant of attempts by local governments to do the same thing.
In City of Richmond u. J.A. Croson Co." Justice White joined
the Court majority holding that Richmond's minority set-aside
program for city-funded public works projects, modeled upon
the federal government's program upheld by the Court in
Fulliloue, violated the right of non-minority contractors to
participate in government contracts. Although Congress had
been explicitly empowered by the Civil War Amendments to
enforce the mandate of racial equality, the fact that "Congress
may identify a n d redress t h e effects of society-wide
discrimination does not mean, a fortiori, the States and their
political subdivisions are free to decide that such remedies are
appr~priate.'"~Instead, the Fourteenth Amendment imposed
"clear limits on the States' use of race as a criterion for
legislative action," since the Amendment reflected "a distrust of
state legislative enactments based on race."" Without any
compelling evidence that Richmond was responding to
discrimination in city public works contracting, the fact that a
city, in which blacks constituted 50% of the population and
held a majority of the city council seats, had adopted a policy
designed to assist black-owned business prompted concern that
a political majority was acting to the disadvantage of a
minority-this time
Justice White also remained faithful throughout his tenure
on the Court to the Kennedy Justice Department's belief that
equality for racial minorities could best be achieved through
political participation-through
voting. A quick review of
Justice White's approach to the Court's voting rights cases
indicates that White never veered from his steadfast support
for a broad federal guarantee of the right of racial minorities to
participate in the electoral process and to have their votes
counted.
In United Jewish Organizations u.
Justice White,
writing for a plurality of the Court, upheld against
constitutional attack a state legislative redistricting plan that
used racial considerations in drawing district lines so as to

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

488 U.S. 469 (1989).
Id. at 490.
Id. at 491.
Id. at 495-96.
430 U.S. 144 (1977).
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comply with the Voting Rights A d 4 The effect of the plan
was to divide a large Hasidic Jewish community in Brooklyn
into two state Assembly districts, one of which contained a
majority non-white population. The Justice found that "the
Constitution does not prevent a State subject to the Voting
Rights Act from deliberately creating or preserving black
majorities in particular districts in order to ensure that its
reapportionment plan complies with 5 5? Although the plan
could be justified as a remedial measure, he thought that "[tlhe
permissible use of racial criteria is not confined to eliminating
the effects of past discriminatory districting or apporti~nment."'~Moreover, the Hasidic community had not been
denied a fair and equal opportunity to participate in the
electoral process, nor did the plan "minimize or unfairly cancel
out white voting strength."" White felt that a state, seeking
'Yo alleviate the consequences of racial voting at the polls and
to achieve a fair allocation of political power between white and
nonwhite voters," could constitutionally "attempt to prevent
racial minorities from being repeatedly outvoted by creating
districts that will afford fair representation" to these
underrepresented
Emboldened by the Court's
decision in United Jewish Organizations, Congress amended
the Voting Rights Act in 1982 to effectively mandate the
creation of congressional districts in which racial minorities
constitute a majority of the p o p u l a t i ~ n . ~ ~
Justice White served long enough to see the Rehnquist
Court retreat from the broad affirmation of congressional power

84. Congress, in addressing the variety of ways that recalcitrant state
legislatures could draw district lines to dilute minority voting power and thereby
prevent the election of minority representatives, passed the Voting Rights Act of
1965 which, among other things, required certain states to submit reapportionment
plans to the Attorney General for approval. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No.
89-110, 5 5, 79 Stat. 439 (currently codified, a s amended, a t 42 U.S.C. 8 1973(c)
(1988)).
85. 430 U.S. a t 161 (opinion of White, J.).
86. Id.
87. Id. a t 165 (opinion of White, J.). White explicitly noted that even under
the challenged plan "[tlhe percentage of districts with nonwhite majorities [(30%)]
was less than the percentage of nonwhites in the county as a whole (35%)." Id. a t
163 (opinion of White, J.). "Thus, even if voting in the county occurred strictly
according to race, whites would not be underrepresented relative to their share of
the population." Id. a t 166 (opinion of White, J.).
88. Id. a t 167, 168 (opinion of White, J.).
89. Voting Rights A d Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 5 3, 96 Stat.
134 (currently codiiied a t 42 U.S.C. 5 197300) (1988)).
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articulated in United Jewish Organizations, though the Justice
remained steadfast in his commitment to enhancing the
political participation of historically underrepresented or
disenfranchised groups. In his last opinion on the Court,
Justice White dissented from the Court's holding in Shaw u.
Reno:' where the Court ruled that a reapportionment scheme
designed t o create a minority congressional seat may violate
the Equal Protection Clause if it could be understood only as
a n effort to segregate voters into separate districts on the basis
of race. Despite t h e fact t h a t t h e North Carolina
reapportionment plan challenged in Shaw still ensured that
whites, who constituted 76% of the total population and 78% of
the voting age population, retained a voting majority in ten of
twelve (83%) of the State's congressional districts:' the Court
felt that the redistricting plan bore "an uncomfortable
resemblance to political a~artheid."'~White chastised the
Court for comparing this remedial political reform to
affirmative action since "remedying a Voting Rights Act
violation does not involve preferential treatment. It involves,
instead, an attempt to equalize treatment, and to provide
minority voters with an effective voice in the political
process."93 Consistent with Robert Kennedy's faith in political
participation as the principal means for blacks and other racial
minorities to achieve e q ~ a l i t y , ' Justice
~
White distinguished
efforts to segregate minority voters so as to dilute their voting
strength-the
political apartheid which troubled the
Court-from efforts mandated by the Voting Rights Act, which
did not seek to entrench the political strength of the majority
but to increase the political influence of minorities who had
historically been disenfranchised. In fact, White reproached the
Court for "unnecessarily hinder[ing] to some extent a State's
voluntary effort to ensure a modicum of minority
representation.yyg5
J u s t i c e White's limited departures i n s t a t u t o r y
construction cases from the egalitarian agenda of progressives
are trivial in comparison with the vast areas of the law-school

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

113 S. Ct. 2816, 2834 (1993) (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2838 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2827.
Id. at 2842-43 (White, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2841 (White, J., dissenting).
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desegregation, affirmative action, voting rights, and
reapportionment-where the Justice consistently supported the
principle of equality. Justice White, both during the Warren
Court era and during the subsequent Burger and Rehnquist
Courts, remained faithful to the Kennedy liberalism that
favored the political, not judicial, process as the best means t o
accomplish the difficult task of making "equal protection of the
laws" more than an empty promise. Moreover, the Justice gave
broad latitude t o congressional efforts t o prohibit private
discrimination and remedy the legacy of past discrimination
through remedial programs such as affirmative action.

IV. JUSTICEWHITEAND INDIVIDUALISM
The Warren Court, through its doctrine of applying t o the
states the constitutional protections embodied in the Bill of
Rights and its decisions such as Baker v. Carr that rested
legislative apportionment on population rather than historical
political boundaries, simultaneously repudiated a broad
conception of states' rights and developed a jurisprudence
centered upon the protection of individual rights. Like Chief
Justice Earl Warren and Justice William J. Brennan, but
unlike Justices Felix Frankfurter and John M. Harlan, justice
White demonstrated little sympathy for states' rights, which "is
a form of cultural pluralism that valorizes the diversity of local
cultures."g6Moreover, he generally found it "incomprehensible
t o appeal" to states' rights "as a reason not to protect
individual rights."" Like Warren and Brennan, Justice White
was a consistently ardent nationalist.
White first expressed his nationalism in a dissenting
opinion in an important 1963 preemption case, Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul.g8More significantly during the
Warren Court era, he joined majority opinions authored by
Justice Brennan in three cases that had a profound
,~~
nationalizing impact: New York Times Co. v. S u l l i ~ a nwhich
nationalized the law of libel; Fay v. Noia,loOwhich removed
bars to habeas corpus proceedings in federal courts instituted

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
(1991).

Post, supm note 3, at 126.

Id.
373 U.S. 132, 159 (1963) (White,J., dissenting).
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
372 U.S. 391 (1963), abrogated by Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546
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by prisoners in state cu~tody;'~'and Dombrowski v.
Pfister,lo2 which expanded federal jurisdiction in civil rights
cases. As another scholar has observed, "Justice White
consistently has supported broad-ranging federal authority and
vigorous institutions of national government" and "has attached
great importance to national unification, and the supremacy
and uniformity of federal law."lo3
Justice White, in short, consistently strove to undermine
aberrant, localistic policies obstructing the advancement of
individuals. In pursuit of this individualist goal, he authored
and joined opinions limiting the power of local communities
and enhancing the power of the national government. Even
during the Rehnquist Court era, Justice White, writing for the
majority in Missouri v. Jenkins,la4 affirmed the power of the
federal judiciary to order tax increases in order t o fund
constitutionally mandated school desegregation plans. In his
view, the ability of a federal court to direct a local authority to
raise taxes "is plainly a judicial act within the power of a
federal court," and any state statute preventing the local
authority from levying the additional taxes disregards "the
obligations of local governments, under the Supremacy Clause,
t o fulfill the requirements that the Constitution imposes on
them."'" Justice White also supported legislative apportionment schemes that destroyed the power of localities in the
legislative process and instead gave equal voice to every
individual. He worked t o make the political branches of
government effective institutions for the advancement of
individual well-being.
, a nationalist,
Thus, White, like Warren and B r e ~ a nwas
but unlike them he was not a complete individualist. There
was another side to Warren's and Breman's individualism-its
opposition to governmental authority-that Justice White never
shared. When the interests of a particular individual came into
conflict with the interests of those individuals who had
effectively gained control of the instruments of government,
liberals like Justice Breman generally created individual
101. But compare Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316-17 (1989), where White
concurred in a judgment of the Court creating new bars to habeas relief.
102. 380 US. 479 (1965).
103. Jonathan D. Varat, Justice White and the Breadth and Allocation of
Federal Authority, 58 U . COLO. L. REV.371, 371-72 (1987).
104. 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
105. Id. at 55, 58.
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rights that acted as trumps over government a~thority.''~
Justice White, in contrast, never adopted this antiauthoritarian stance.
The Supreme Court's controversial forays into the
expansion of individual rights under the rubric of substantive
due process never received Justice White's support. In Griswold
the Justice rejected resting the decision on a broad conception
of unenumerated rights protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment; rather he based his vote to
overturn Connecticut's anti-contraception law on its utter
inability to achieve the professed goals of the State.''' To
Justice White, the problem with the Court's willingness to
expand constitutional rights was that the political process, not
the judiciary, was a far better forum for balancing the
competing interests involved in defining the scope of rights.
The primary evil lay in the fact that judicial recognition of a
constitutional right automatically discarded the careful
compromises reached by political resolution of the issues in
state legislatures. In the absence of an explicit Constitutional
provision upon which to rely, Justice White refused to accept
the idea that nine Justices of the Supreme Court had the
legitimate authority to set aside the considered judgment of
state legislatures representing, as they do, the will of the
people. Regardless of his own personal views, the Justice
refused to impose his own moral hierarchy upon state
legislatures, even if he did agree, for instance, that women
should have the right to undergo an abortion.
Justice White gave strong voice to these views in his
dissent in Roe u. Wade,lo8a case that still divides the nation
and the Court. As the Justice wrote, referring t o the Court's
favoring of women's reproductive freedom over the State's
interest in the life of the unborn, "[wlhether or not I might
agree with that marshaling of values, I can in no event join the
Court's judgment because I find no constitutional warrant for
imposing such an order of priorities on the people and
legislatures of the state^."'^^ "I find nothing in the language
or history of the Constitution to support the Court's

106. See RONALDDWORKIN,
TAKINGRIGHTS SERIOUSLY
(1977).
107. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
108. 410 U.S. 113, 221 (1973) (White, J., dissenting), modified by Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
109. Id. at 222 (White, J., dissenting).
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judgments," and therefore, "[tlhis issue, for the most part,
should be left with the people and to the political processes the
While "[als an
people have devised t o govern their
exercise of raw judicial power" the Court had the authority to
invalidate Texas' anti-abortion statute, the Court's
"improvident and extravagant exercise" of this authority had
deprived the people of their right "to weigh the relative
importance of the continued existence and development of the
fetus, on the one hand, against a spectrum of possible impacts
on the mother, on the other hand.""' As recently as 1992,
Justice White expressed his willingness t o join three other
Justices in overturning Roe. 'I2
Justice White restated his hostility to judicial recognition
of unenumerated yet fundamental rights, this time while
writing for a majority of the Court, in Bowers u. Hardwick,l13
in which the Court held that the Constitution did not protect
the right of homosexuals to engage in consensual acts of
sodomy. Noting that "[tlhe Court is most vulnerable and comes
nearest t o illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made
constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the
language or design of the Constitution," the Justice was "quite
unwilling" to announce a "fundamental right to engage in
homosexual sodomy," particularly since other forms of sexual
conduct such as adultery or incest remain criminal even when
committed in the home.114
White's repudiation of an expansive, rights-oriented
jurisprudence reflected not only his faith in the democratic
process and fear of the delegitimatizing effect of judicial
activism but also his own pragmatic concern that the courts
were ill-equipped t o undertake the controversial and complex
inquiries necessary to identify and articulate the permissible
scope of democratic legislation and individual rights. White
repudiated any attempt t o limit the authority of the majority to
impose particular conceptions of morality as a legitimate basis

110. Id. at 221, 222 (White, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 222 (White, J., dissenting).
112. P l a ~ e dParenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2855 (1992) (Rehnquist,
C.J., joined by White, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part); id. at 2873 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and
White and Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
113. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
114. Id. at 191, 194-96.

3131 MODERN FEDERALIST & NEW DEAL LIBERAL

333

for legislation. In fact, White recognized in Bowers that the law
"is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws
representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated . . .
the courts will be very busy indeed."ll5 Moreover, the overuse
of the power of judicial review would reduce respect for the
Court and waste its precious political capital necessary to
achieve dramatic social reform in other areas, such as school
desegregation.
It is important to understand, however, that Byron White's
rejection of the use of individual rights as trumps over
government authority did not signal an ideological change from
when he first-entered government and initially came to the
Court. In fact, White's deference to the legislative process and
his concomitant hostility to arguments focusing on
unenumerated yet fundamental rights reflected the training he
received as a young student at Yale Law School in the late
1940s' during the heyday of legal realism and the aftermath of
the New Deal.'16 Concerned that an imperial judiciary acting
on its own preconceived notions of fundamental rights posed a
grave threat to the democratically adopted social and economic
reforms passed during the New Deal,"' the legal realists
taught that all legal reasoning reflects the sociological cast of
the judge. Since every legal decision is therefore tainted by-if
not entirely a reflection of-the judge's policy preferences, the
judiciary should defer t o the policy choices made by the
legislative and executive branches as the democratically elected
branches of government accountable to the people. In fact, in
Bowers the Justice acknowledged the Court's need "to assure
itself and the public that announcing rights not readily
identifiable in the Constitution's text involves much more than
the imposition of the Justices' own choice of values on the
States and the Federal G ~ v e r n m e n t . " ~ ~ ~
In addition to the narrow scope accorded the right t o
privacy, Justice White also disfavored an expansive view of the
rights of criminal defendants and the rights of radical
protestors. This is not surprising since the Kennedy Justice
115. Id. at 196.
116. See Nelson, supra note 27, at 348; see also LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL
REALISMAT YALE,1927-1960, at 145-64 (1986) (discussing postwar realism at Yale).
117. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled by West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). But see Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502 (1934).
118. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
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Department, of which Byron White was so central a part, also
had an unfavorable record toward individual rights in these
two areas. Byron White probably shared at least some
responsibility for the Department's policies during his year of
service there, and, on the whole, he continued to vote
consistently with those policies upon his ascension to the
bench.
The Kennedy Justice Department showed little enthusiasm
for expanding the constitutional rights of persons accused of a
crime. Indeed, Robert Kennedy himself had built his early
reputation as counsel t o the Senate's Select Committee on
Improper Labor Activities, where he had vigorously pursued
the likes of Dave Beck and Jimmy Hoffallg and "attack[ed]
organized criminals with weapons and techniques as effective
as their own."120In particular, critics of Kennedy's techniques
of treating "the
accused him of "badgering . . . witnes~es,"'~~
plea of self-incrimination [als tantamount to a confession of
guilt," and of holding "hearings for the sole purpose of accusing,
judging and condemning people."lz2 Even Arthur Schlesinger,
Kennedy's sympathetic biographer, agreed that Kennedy "had
displayed an excess of zeal" and "was a man driven by a
conviction of righteousness, a fanaticism of virtue, [and] a
certitude about guilt that vaulted over gaps in eviden~e."'~~
This tough attitude toward racketeering and other crime, and a
corresponding tendency to construe narrowly the law of
criminal constitutional procedure, continued after Kennedy
became Attorney General, when he proposed that the
administration support legislation t o permit wiretapping when
authorized by a federal judge, a proposal that Byron White as
Deputy Attorney General strongly supported.124
The K e ~ e d yJustice Department's faith in the prevailing
power structure also demonstrated itself in its attitude toward
the right of blacks--or anyone else for that matter-to engage
in protests that might offend public sensibilities. The Kennedy

119. See generally SCHLESINGER,
supra note 4, at 137-69.
120. Id. at 169 (quoting Robert Kennedy).
121. Id. at 149 (quoting George M. Belknap to Robert F. Kennedy, Mar. 8,
1957, JPK Papers).
122. Id. at 188 (quoting Alexander M. Bickel, Robert F. Kennedy: The Case
Jan. 9, 1961).
Against Him for Attorney General, NEWREPUBLIC,
123. Id. at 189.
124. See NAVASKY,
supra note 4, at 74-75; SCHLESINGER,
supra note 4, at 27071.
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Justice Department had little understanding of the functions of
protest or how to deal with it, and accordingly the Department
did a terrible job providing federal protection for civil rights
demonstrators in the South. The position of the Justice
Department was that state governments had the duty to
protect citizens-including black citizens-from violence, and
accordingly the Department routinely negotiated with state and
local officials to provide protection rather than use the F.B.I. or
the army for that purpose.'25 Officials like Burke Marshall
"were very concerned about the complex . . . problems implied
in the use of federal force," even when they "could have written
a n executive order permitting a n occupation" of a southern
state by the military. They found use of the military "as a
practical matter . . . impossible" and as "a policy matter . . .
~ndesirable."'~~
Nicholas Katzenbach thought it "all very well
to move troops in" but then wondered "how . . . you get them
o~t,"'~'while Byron White's close friend, Louis Oberdorfer,
thought "[~Jivilianauthority ought to avoid the use of troops
like the plague." Troops were "an insult to the people" and set
"a precedent for some less civilized President to use in a
tyrannical way. "Iz8
Death and mayhem resulted among civil rights workers on
many occasions from the absence of federal protection, and the
"unbelievable position of confidence" which the Kennedy Justice
Department had maintained "in t h e minds of t h e
~ p p r e s s e d " ' ~rapidly eroded. When several black leaders,
including Jerome Smith, a CORE official who had been
bludgeoned by southern police, met in 1963 with Robert
Kennedy and Burke Marshall, they reported that begging for
federal protection while fighting for the American dream of
equal rights made them "nauseous,*'3o while Smith
acknowledged he would "[n]e~er"'~'serve in a war on behalf
of the United States. When Kennedy reported his shock at
these statements, the black leaders, in turn, "were shocked that
he was shocked."'32 From that point on the meeting

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

See NAVASKY,
supra note 4, at 119-20, 164-67.
Id. at 198.
Id. at 198-99.
Id. at 199.
Id. at 204.
Id. at 113.
supra note 4, at 332.
SCHLESINGER,
NAVASKY,
supm note 4, at 113.
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deteriorated into a "violent, emotional verbal assault" on
Kennedy1= with the blacks stating that Kennedy could not
"understand what this young man is saying"'54 and Kennedy
feeling that the black leaders "didn't want to talk" about facts
but were all "emotion, hysteria-they
stood up and
of them wept and left the
orated-they
cursed-some
room."'35 In his years as Attorney General, Robert Kennedy
simply could not understand what this fear and distrust of
government was about.
Once elevated to the Supreme Court, Justice White
continued to adhere to the attitudes on criminal procedure and
radical protest that had been prevalent in the Justice
Department during his brief stint as Deputy Attorney General.
As a result, those who had hoped that Justice White, as
President Kennedy's first appointee to the Supreme Court,
would regularly side with Chief Justice Earl Warren in
important cases were quickly disillusioned. A mere two months
after his appointment, he wrote his first major dissent t o an
opinion of a Warren majority. The case that provoked White's
which held that the
dissent was Robinson u. Calif~rnia,'~~
states could not make narcotics addiction a crime. In response,
the new Justice, wanting not t o impede local police efforts t o
stamp out narcotics abuse, accused the majority of "writ[ing]
into the Constitution its own abstract notions of how best t o
handle the narcotics pr~blern."'~'
Justice White's string of dissents from some of the major
criminal procedure opinions of the Warren Court continued
thereafter. He dissented in Escobedo u. I l l i n ~ i s , ' ~
which
invalidated a confession obtained at a police station from a
defendant who had asked to see his lawyer, who was present in
another room in the station house; in Malloy u. Hogan,ls9
which held the Fifth Amendment binding on the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment; in Miranda u. Arizona,'" which
prohibited all custodial interrogation in the absence of an

supra note 4, at 333 (quoting Kenneth Clark, who was
133. SCHLESINGER,
present at the meeting).
134. Id. at 332.
135. Id. at 334.
136. 370 U S . 660, 685 (1962) (White, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 689 (White, J., dissenting).
138. 378 U S . 478, 495 (1964) (White, J., dissenting).
139. 378 U.S. 1, 33 (1964) (White, J., dissenting).
140. 384 U.S. 436, 526 (1966) (White, J., dissenting).
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attorney; in Berger u. New York,14' which invalidated New
York legislation authorizing wiretapping upon issuance of a
judicial warrant; and in United States v. Wade,14' which
prohibited the holding of post-indictment lineups in the absence
of counsel.
In his dissents, White expressed a concern similar to that
held by Robert Kennedy and the Kennedy Justice Department
about the effectiveness of law enforcement. In Miranda, for
instance, he wrote that the majority's rule would "slow down
the investigation and the apprehension of confederates" and
"return a killer, a rapist or other criminal to the streets . . . t o
repeat his crime."'43 He worried about the rule's "impact on
those who rely on the public authority for protection and who
without it can engage only in violent self-help."'" Similarly
in Berger u. New Y ~ r k , 'where
~ ~ the majority struck down a
statute similar t o one that White supported as Deputy Attorney
General,146the Justice argued that official eavesdropping and
wiretapping are "irreplaceable investigative tools which are
needed for the enforcement of criminal laws," especially in view
of the "interrelation between organized crime and corruption of
government officials" and "the enormous difficulty of
eradicating both forms of social cancer."14'
His concern for effective law enforcement endured until his
last days on the Court. With the conservative ascendance of the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts, the federal judiciary took an
increasingly hostile view of the rights of the accused, and
Justice White found himself authoring opinions of the Court
instead of dissents. A classic example of White's pragmatism
and concern for effective law enforcement is Minnesota v.
Di~kerson,'~~
in which the Court upheld the right of the police
to seize contraband, such as cocaine, detected while frisking a
suspect. Justice White believed that the "practical
considerations" that justified the warrantless seizure of
contraband in the "plain view" of the police also justified the

388 U.S. 41, 107 (1967) (White, J., dissenting).
388 U.S. 218, 250 (1967) (White, J., dissenting).
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 542, 544 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 542 (White, J., dissenting).
388 U.S. 41 (1967).
See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
Berger, 388 U.S. at 113, 116-17 (White, J., dissenting).
113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).
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seizure of materials discovered during a routine pat-down of a
suspect.14'
Nevertheless, Justice White proved not to be a complete
conservative. Thus he joined the Court's opinion in Gideon v.
Wainwrightls0 requiring appointment of counsel for all
indigents accused of felonies, and wrote a concurring opinion in
Spinelli v. United States,lsl a 5-3 decision requiring strict
guidelines for the issuance of search warrants based on
informants' tips. In 1967, he authored two leading decisions
applying the Fourth Amendment to administrative
searches,152 and in the years following Earl Warren's
retirement as Chief Justice, White joined in two important procivil-liberties decisions: Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,lss which authorized judicial
implication of civil remedies for violation of the Constitution,
and Furman v. Georgia,ls4 which temporarily suspended use
of the death penalty. In the past decade, he even dissented on
occasion from majority opinions upholding warrantless searches
in criminal cases,155and in James v. ~llinois'" he provided
the critical fifth vote in a 5-4 case that refused to enlarge the
impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule. In one of the
last Court opinions which White authored before he retired,
Helling u. McKinney,ls7he held that the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment prevented
state prison authorities from exposing prisoners to
unreasonable risks to their hture health by placing them in a
cell with a smoker.
Moreover, Justice White's refusal to acknowledge a broad
panoply of federally protected individual rights did not stem
from the old Frankfurter-Harlan concern for state autonomy.
The Justice never opposed the application of the Bill of Rights
to the states; indeed, he authored Duncan v. Louisiana,'" a
149. Id. at 2137.
150. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
151. 393 U.S. 410, 423 (1969) (White, J., concurring), abrogated by Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
152. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523 (1967).
153. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
154. 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
155. See Varat, supra note 103, at 406.
156. 493 U.S. 307 (1990).
157. 113 S. Ct. 2475 (1993).
158. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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leading incorporation opinion. When White dissented from
criminal procedure cases, he did so on the merits-with reasons
applicable in federal as well as state prosecutions-because he
thought the majority was too severely restricting the power of
all levels of government by creating individual rights. Thus,
Justice White's views on issues of constitutional criminal
procedure do not follow a discernible pattern embraced by other
members of the Court.
A comparably mixed but ultimately anti-individualist
pattern emerges from White's votes and opinions in a series of
freedom of expression cases that came before the Court during
the social tumult of the 1960s. In the first two of these cases,
the Justice voted to protect protestors' rights of expression.
Thus, in Edwards v. South C a r ~ l i n a , 'he
~ ~joined an opinion
of the Court reversing breach of the peace convictions of 187
black students who had marched along the grounds of the state
capitol to protest against racial discrimination; the
Constitution, according to the Court, did "not permit a State to
make criminal the peaceful expression of unpopular views,"
especially when the convictions were not the product of "the
evenhanded application of a precise and narrowly drawn
regulatory statute."'60 Similarly in Brown v. Lo~isiana,'~'
involving the conviction of five young blacks for refusing t o
leave a segregated reading room of a public library, White
found it "difficult to avoid the conclusion that petitioners were
asked to leave the library because they were Negroes,"'" and
therefore he concurred in reversing the convictions. He was
also willing to concur in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District,'" which permitted high school
students to wear black armbands in protest against the
Vietnam War.
When protest threatened either t o destabilize the power
structure or to become offensive, however, White pulled back
from a broad reading of the First Amendment. In Cox v.
L ~ u i s i a n a , ' he
~ would have affirmed the conviction of a
159. 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
160. Id. at 236-37.
161. 383 U.S. 131, 150 (1966) (White, J., concurring in the result).
162. Id. at I51 (White, J., concurring in the result).
163. 393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969) (White, J., concurring). For later majority and
dissenting opinions by White upholding the rights of high school students, see
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 683 (1977) (White, J., dissenting), and Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
164. 379 U S . 536 (1965); 379 U.S. 559, 591 (1965) (White, J., concurring in
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minister who led a march on the third-floor jail in a local
courthouse to protest the arrest of students who had picketed
stores maintaining segregated lunch counters. In Justice
White's view, the marchers had obstructed public passageways
and, by marching on a courthouse, had threatened the
independence and integrity of the judiciary. The next year he
became part of a 5-4 majority affirming the convictions of black
students who had demonstrated on the premises of a jail,'"
and two years after that case, he joined another majority that
affirmed a conviction of an anti-war protester who had burned
his draft card? Arguably, demonstrations in a jail yard and
public burnings of draft cards somehow threatened the ability
of government agencies-the prison system and the Selective
Service System-to carry out their functions; and perhaps these
slim threats t o the functioning of government account for
Justice White's narrow reading of the First Amendment in the
Adderley and O'Brien cases. A year after O'Brien, however, the
Justice made it clear that he would permit the prosecution of
protesters even when their protests lacked any tendency to
destabilize the power structure: in his dissent in Street v. New
yorklB7and his later refusal to join the majority in Cohen u.
California,'" he signalled his view that offensive protest,
such as burning the flag or including four-letter expletives in
political speeches, was not entitled to constitutional protection.
Justice White's lukewarm support for dissenters' rights of
free expression continued into the 1980s. For instance, in Perry
Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'nlB9the Justice,
writing for the majority of the Court, held that the First
Amendment's Free Speech Clause did not forbid a school
district from giving the exclusive bargaining representative of

part and dissenting in part).
165. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
166. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
167. 394 U.S. 576, 610 (1969) (White, J., dissenting). Justice White joined the
dissents in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 421 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting), and United States v. Eichman, 496 US. 310, 319 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting), in which a divided Court reaffirmed that burning the American flag is
protected expression under the First Amendment. The dissent in Taus u. Johnson
equated flag burning with "an inarticulate grunt or roar that . . . is most likely to
be indulged in not to express any particular idea, but to antagonize others."
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 432 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
168. 403 U.S. 15, 28 (1971) (White, J., concurring in part with the dissenting
opinion of Blackmun, J.).
169. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
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the district's teachers preferential access t o the district's
internal mail system, even though a rival union sought access.
Since the mail system was not a traditional or designated
public forum open for use by the public generally, the district
needed only show that its denial of equal access was
"reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely
because public officials oppose the speaker's view."'" As long
as there was no conscious purpose on the part of officials "to
discourage one viewpoint and advance another," White saw
nothing wrong with granting preferential treatment due t o the
one union's status as the exclusive bargaining representative of
the district teachers,'?' even if the effect of the preference
would be to preserve the power of the established union at the
expense of the potentially destabilizing outsider.
Justice White appears to have been ready t o give effect to
libertarian values incorporated in the First Amendment only
when they posed no danger of destabilizing or offending
traditional sensibilities. Thus, in Lamb's Chapel v. Center
~ authored a
Moriches Union Free School D i ~ t r i c t , ' ~he
unanimous opinion striking down as a violation of the First
Amendment a school district regulation that prohibited the
after-hours use of school property for meetings with religious
purposes, on the ground that the regulation discriminated
against the presentation of religious views concerning
otherwise acceptable subjects such as the family and childrearing.173 Justice White dismissed the school district's
concern that to allow religious groups t o use school facilities
would violate the Establishment Clause, since there was "no
realistic danger that the community would think that the
District was endorsing religion or any particular creed, and any
benefit t o religion or to the Church would have been no more
than in~idental."'~~
Justice White's views about the propagation of traditional
values, the propriety of rational political discourse, and the
inappropriateness of destabilizing and offensive protest were
probably shared by most liberal Americans in the early 1960s.
His views were certainly shared by his colleagues in the

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 46.
Id. at 49.
113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
Id. at 2143, 2147.
Id. at 2148.
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Kennedy Justice Department: recall, for instance, the 1963
meeting between Department officials and black activists a t
which Robert Kennedy was shocked by the statement of a
young black activist that he would not fight for the nation in a
war.175 By the late 1960s, however, many liberals had
changed their views: Robert Kennedy himself, after attending a
June, 1968 meeting with black militants in Oakland,
California, where he was abused with statements such as, we
"don't want to hear none of your shit. What the goddamned hell
are you going to do, boy," told an aide that he was "glad" he
had gone to the meeting, since the militants "need to know
someone who'll listen."176 He knew that many blacks have
"got a lot of hostility and lots of reasons for it" and that,
"[wlhen they get somebody like me, they're going to take it out
on me."177 He also knew that, "after all the abuse the blacks
have taken through the centuries, whites are just going to have
to let them get some of these feelings out."178As the Kennedy
biographer Arthur Schlesinger commented, Robert Kennedy
had taken a "long journey" from his first meeting with black
militants nearly five years earlier?' Justice White, having
gone to the Court, never took that journey and so had
remained in a world where rational discourse rather than
emotion was the essence of political expression in a free society.
AND THE SUPREMECOURT
V. THE NEWLIBERALISM

As we have seen, Justice White diverged from other
liberals on the Supreme Court i n a variety of cases. Although
he joined the liberals in most of the civil rights cases,
particularly those dealing with the desegregation of public
facilities, White refused to sign on to the liberal agenda of
recognizing and expanding individual rights. In the seminal
right to privacy cases such as Roe and Bowers, in the criminal
procedure cases such as Miranda and Escobedo, in the freedom
of expression cases such as Texas v. Johnson and United States
v. Cohen, White and other liberal Justices found themselves on
opposing sides of a n ongoing jurisprudential debate. While the
Warren Court's embrace of individual rights unleashed a tidal

175.
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177.
178.
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See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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supra note 4 , at 909.
Id. at 908.
Id. at 909.
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wave of liberal academic commentary that envisioned the
judiciary as an engine for social change, Justice White
remained steadfast in his belief that the Court's ability and
authority to engineer a better world were limited.
This refusal to embrace the individual-rights-oriented
jurisprudence of the Warren Court did not reflect as much a
conservative shift for the Justice as a distinct ideological
transformation in concepts of liberalism. The late 1960s
wrought a fundamental change in the goals of many American
liberals. In the early 1960s the goal of liberals-and the
primary goal of the Warren Court-was the use of national
power, including the judiciary's power, to facilitate pragmatic
social change, especially in the areas of racial equality and
legislative apportionment. For this purpose, government and
the democratic political process were to be trusted and their
power enhanced, not impaired. When he was appointed to the
Court in 1962, Justice White agreed with this liberal agenda of
nationalism, democracy, equality, and pragmatic social reform.
But the Warren Court also embraced a second goal: the
enhancement of individual rights and the consequent
restriction of governmental authority. Justice White never
signed on t o this anti-statist program. When he came to the
Court in the early 1960s, it was a subsidiary part of the
Warren agenda. But as first the racial protests, then the
Vietnam War and the anti-war protests, and finally the
misfeasance of the Nixon years convinced many Americans that
government often cannot be trusted, the goal of creating
individual rights to restrict governmental power assumed
increasing centrality for the liberal wing of the Warren and
Burger Courts. The Justice had not changed; liberalism had.
The divergence between Justice White and other liberals
on the Court also reflected division on a more fundamental
question of political philosophy: the value of individual rights
in a representative democracy. Jurists and academics alike
have struggled for over two centuries with the question of how
to integrate the distinctly anti-majoritarian notion of individual
rights into a system of government premised upon the
democratic majoritarian ideal.''' During the early debates
over ratification of the Constitution, Federalists and AntiFederalists divided over the need for an express enumeration of
180. HENRYS. COMMAGER,
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RIGHTS(1943); JOHN
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individual rights in the constitutional text. The potential
tyrannical impulse of the majority troubled both Federalists
and Anti-Federalists alike, but the two groups diverged over
how to address the problem. The Federalists had an abiding
faith that the democratic process, if properly constructed, could
mitigate the intemperate zeal of the majority. In The Federalist
No. 10, James Madison argued that both the size of the
republic and the method of electing representatives insured
that factions could not constitute a repressive majority.lgl
While the Federalists thought the answer lay in the structure
of the government, the Anti-Federalists desired an express
enumeration of individual rights to limit the power of the
national government.lg2 Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist No. 84 responded that a bill of rights was not only
unnecessary but "dangerous" since the enumeration of rights
"would afford a colorable pretext to claim more [powers] than
were granted."lm Nevertheless, the Anti-Federalists demanded, as the price for their support in ratifying the Constitution,
a promise by the Federalists to introduce a bill of rights in the
first Congress.la
The history of American jurisprudence in the intemening
two hundred years confirms that no final resolution of this
debate has been achieved. At different points in American
history, one view has prevailed for a period of time only to
witness the reemergence of the other. In the early twentieth
century, for example, the Court embarked, under the aegis of
substantive due process, upon a dramatic and controversial
program of invalidating national and state legislation in the
name of individual property rights. In cases such as Lochner,
the Court set aside progressive socio-economic legislation in the
name of liberty of contract. Although the New Deal nailed
closed the coffin on economic substantive due process,lg5the
underlying tension between majoritarianism and individual
rights remained.lg6 The Warren Court's expansion of civil
181. THE FEDERALIST
No. 10, at 127-28 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed.,
1987).
117-22 (Herbert
182. See Essays of Brutus, reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST
J. Storing ed., 1985).
183. THE FEDERALIST
No. 84, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick
ed., 1987).
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184. See RICHARD
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rights for individuals rekindled the long-standing debate; much
of the criticism levelled by liberals at the Lochner-era Court
found new adherents in the conservative critics of the Warren
Court and its jurisprudential progeny such as Roe.18'
Here lies the most important lesson t o draw from
American constitutional history: the recognition and expansion
of individual rights is not the sole province, much less the
defining characteristic, of liberalism. The most ardent critics of
Lochner-era jurisprudence were the New Dealers intent upon
using the power of government t o implement progressive social
policies, and it was jurisprudential liberals, precursors of
Justice Byron R. White, who repudiated the doctrine of
substantive due process that jeopardized and delayed the
implementation of the New Deal. Moreover, an individualrights-oriented jurisprudence is not the sole domain of
liberalism even today. Several noted academic theorists such as
Richard Epstein and Bernard Siegan are proponents of an
individual-rights-basedjurisprudence that, if ever embraced by
the Court, would trigger an avalanche of liberal ~riticism.'~
Many of the hallmarks of liberalism, such as rent control,
employment discrimination, and consumer protection statutes,
would be among its first victims. Thus, to equate liberalism
with individual rights is to take a very narrow view both of
American constitutional history and of the ends of liberalism.
This tension between individual rights and majoritarian
power also implicates a more fundamental and long-standing
debate among political theorists. At the time of the American
founding, two competing conceptions of just government were
fighting for preeminence in Western political philosophy. On
the one hand, the Scottish philosopher David Hume and the
French political theorist Montesquieu had focused upon
republican mechanisms for creating a regime immune to the
destabilizing and reactionary impulses of majoritarian
govern~nent.'~~
Hume acknowledged that human nature was
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inherently self-interested and that "[a111 plans of government
which suppose great reformation in the manners of mankind
are plainly imaginary."lgOInstead, the superior regime was
one that acknowledged yet counterbalanced the frailties of
human nature. "Good laws may beget order and moderation in
the government where the manners and customs have instilled
little humanity or justice into the tempers of men."191
Montesquieu added that a separation of powers among the
different organs of government, together with a system of
checks and balances among those organs, was the best method
t o ensure both the stability of the regime and its political
liberty.lg2The influence of this strand of liberalism upon the
Federalists should not be doubted. In fact, Madison's The
Federalist No. 10 was both inspired by and borrowed heavily
from Hume.ls3 Presaging Madison's own discourse upon the
propensity of democratic regimes to fall prey to factionalism,
Hume remarked that "[tlhough it is more difficult to form a
republican government in an extensive country than in a city,
there is more facility, when once it is formed, of preserving it
steady and uniform without tumult and faction."'"
On the other side, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel
Kant were less sanguine about the internal mechanics of
political authority. Rather, they, and more particularly Kant,
focused upon the limits and ends of governmental power.
Largely ignoring the practical question upon which Hume and
Montesquieu had dwelled of how to construct the best republic,
Rousseau searched for universal principles of civil government
and claimed that "[ilf one enquires [sic] into precisely wherein
the greatest good of all consists, which should be the purpose of
every system of legislation, one will find that it boils down to
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the two principal objects, liberty and e q ~ a l i t y . " ' ~Rousseau
~
believed that the only sovereign worthy of the name was the
general will of the people and that humanrights were both its
ultimate expression and the greatest safeguard of liberty and
equality.lg6 Kant, who was heavily influenced by Rousseau,
expanded Rousseau's idea that the general will embodied itself
in rights. Kant postulated the kingdom of ends, a metaphysical
empire where autonomous individuals were both rulers and
ruled. This reciprocity, epitomized by the categorical
imperative, reflected Kant's unflagging belief in the inalienable
dignity and equality of humanity. As such, Rousseau and Kant
were the philosophical fathers of modern individualism with its
emphasis on rights as the basis of political legitimacy and
progressivity and its reliance on law as the guarantor of
political liberty and equality. Whether by design or by
happenchance, these two strands of liberalism-the
republicanism of Hume and Montesquieu and the individualism
of Rousseau and Kant-are embedded within the American
political system.
This is where disappointment voiced by many liberals
about Justice White goes astray. Justice White remained a
committed adherent of liberalism, albeit a particular strand of
liberalism that fell out of favor with Justice Brennan and other
judicial liberals. Much like the Federalists of 1787-1788,
Justice White believed i n the republican system with its
reliance on the democratic process. His record in the
reapportionment and voting rights cases reflected his belief
that the most social good comes from a correctly designed and
well-functioning democratic system. In his opinion, political
participation, not judicial creation of rights, holds the greatest
promise for true social and economic reform. As Justice White
suggested in Bowers, the judiciary's recognition of anti-statist,
individual rights would not create a better world for the weak
and powerless any more than anti-statist, property-rights
jurisprudence did in the 1930s.lg7 Only the power of
government can, in White's view, improve the world.
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I n the end, we need to understand that Justice White
divided from other liberals on the Supreme Court like Justice
Brennan, not over whether to be a liberal but over how to be
liberal. White appeared and sometimes acted as a conservative
primarily because of his commitment to a Madisonian political
style focusing on the proper ordering of government
institutions-an
approach t h a t has been co-opted by
conservative theorists in recent decades, and his rejection of
Kantian philosophy-to which today's liberals are tending to
link their cause. But there is no necessary connection between
liberalism and Kantian theory, and thus, it is a mistake to
conclude that Justice White and others who reject Kantian
individualism thereby cease to be progressive.
Indeed, Madisonian thought may in the end prove superior
to Kantian thought as a means to social justice. If the object of
a just society is to protect individuals from majoritarian
encroachment on their rights, Madison's political thought
continues to provide a useful approach. Perhaps it is even
superior to a Kantian approach: the relative value of the two
must depend on the ease with which repressive majorities can
coalesce in a Madisonian world in comparison with the nature
of the rights that any particular interpretation of Kantian
theory would protect, and the solidity with which it would
protect them. If, in contrast, the progressive goal is to
redistribute wealth, Madisonian theory almost surely trumps
Kantian philosophy since it is centrally a theory about
channelling government power for achievement of the public
good, while Kant focuses almost entirely on protecting
individuals.
This Article, which is written to congratulate Justice White
on his retirement after thirty-one years on the bench, is not the
place for ultimate judgments on the relative merits of
Madisonian and Kantian theory. What needs to be noted is
only that Justice White by the end of his tenure had become
the Court's only progressive in the Madisonian and New Deal
tradition-a tradition that has contributed significantly to the
American polity as we know it today. Whether or not we agree
with the Justice, we owe him our appreciation for keeping this
important tradition alive.

